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I INTRODUCTION 
One of the fundamental tenets of a democratic state is public accountability for all 
branches of government. This presupposes that the public has a right to be informed 
about what the government is doing, and can ultimately sanction or penalise these actions 
on election date. A covert intelligence agency, then, would appear to be a thorn in the 
side of a democratic state. Reconciling the two notions of accountability and security of 
state has long been something with which New Zealand, and other democratic states, 
have struggled. 
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS) was brought into existence on 28 
November 1956 by an Order in Council. 1 From this time until the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Act 1969 (the principal Act) was passed the very existence of the 
SIS, not to mention its role and functions within society, were hidden in the shadowy 
realms of Crown prerogative. In 1969 Parliament made a conscious decision to bring the 
SIS, in part at least, out into the open. Although the principal Act basically preserved the 
status quo it was widely felt that it was " .. desirable that [the SIS] should be subject to the 
specific provisions of the law."2 Given that New Zealand is a rule of law state, allowing 
none to be above the law, this stance is hardly surprising; even less so when it is 
considered that the operation of such a service necessarily involves infringement upon 
individuals' rights and liberties. 
As one would expect, a central issue up for debate when the principal Act was passed 
(and every time the SIS has come under public scrutiny since then) was whether it is 
possible to reconcile the secretive nature of a security agency with the principles of a 
democracy. Prima facie there appears to be a direct conflict - " .. [o]n the one hand the 
State claims to guarantee freedoms, and on the other monitors the activities of people 
who exercise them."3 Most people seem willing to accept some friction on the basis that 
the continued existence of our democratic society needs to be ensured by protecting the 
state from genuine subversive threats. Proponents of the SIS describe its main function 
as protecting democracy from the knife at its throat. It needs to be remembered, 
however, that without the balancing feature of accountability the SIS itself could become 
the knife at our democracy' s throat. 
Although this struggle is by no means novel, recent developments in this area provide an 
unique illustration of how the balancing system should work now that the SIS is a 
statutory body - starting with the 1996 amendment to the principal Act and the Choudry 
case, and culminating in the 1998/1999 amendments. 
1 This paper is concerned only with the SIS, for a full discussion of the Government Communications 
Security Bureau (GCSB) see Nicky Hagar Secret Power: New Zealand's Role in the international Spy 
Network (Craig Patton Publishing, Nelson, 1996). 
2 New Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, Report on the New Zealand Security Service Intelligence Act 
1969, (Wellington, 1971), 4. 
3 G. Crowder "The Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 1977 and the State Power to Intercept 
Communications" (1977/78) 9 VUWLR 145, 152. 
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II BACKGROUND 
A Preceding Acts 
Before considering the recent events it is important to have a grasp of the initial statutory 
framework; Parliament' s first attempts to grapple with reconciling accountability and 
security through legislation. 
The principal Act was enacted in 1969 to " .. make better provision for the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service."4 It provided for the service to obtain, correlate and 
evaluate intelligence, to advise Ministers of the Crown in respect of matters relevant to 
security and to co-operate with authorities in New Zealand and overseas. 5 
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 1977 was passed 
subsequent to a report by the then Chief Ombudsman, the late Sir Guy Powles, which 
recommended that the SIS be given powers to intercept and seize any communication 
that was not otherwise lawfully obtainable, under a Ministerial warrant.6 The 
Amendment Act also provided that no civil or criminal proceedings would lie against 
those doing anything " .. necessarily involved in .. the interception."7 It seems reasonably 
clear, with hindsight, that although the SIS had been a statutory body for eight years at 
this time, with all its powers supposedly set out for all to see, there was still a reluctance 
to actually admit what they were doing, that is to explicitly state that individual ' s homes 
were being broken into when it was considered necessary. 
In 1996 the principal Act was again amended, setting in motion the chain of events of 
interest here. The amendment of major concern was the altering of the definition of 
security from 
the protection of New Zealand from acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism and 
subversion, whether or not it is directed from or intended to be committed within New 
Zealand. 8 
to include 
the making of a contribution to New Zealand ' s international well-being or 
economic well-being.9 
A chorus of objectors strongly argued that this inclusion made the definition of security 
too wide and subjective; also that it was open to abuse and could be used by politicians to 
further their own agenda by classifying activists with views contrary to their own as 
4 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Act 1969, long title. [The principal Act] 
5 The principal Act, above n4, s4. 
6 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 1977, s4 (inserting s4A into the principal 
Act) [1977 Amendment] . 
7 
1977 Amendment, above n6, s4(6) (inserting s4A(6) into the principal Act). 
8 The principal Act, above n4, s2 "Security." 
9 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Act 1996, s2(3) [1996 Amendment] . 
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being threats to New Zealand's economic well-being, thereby subjecting them to 
surveillance. Those that made submissions to parliament to that effect were told by 
Committee members that they were paranoid and naive. Ironically these concerns 
seemed to be vindicated only two weeks after the legislation was passed when the SIS 
broke into the home of Mr Choudry, a well known critic of government policies and 
practices. It remains to be seen exactly what sort of threat to New Zealand Mr Choudry 
was.10 The Amendment Act also added to section 4 of the principal Act, the provision 
that the Act would not limit the right of people to engage in lawful dissent and that the 
exercise of this right would not be enough on its own to justify surveillance by the SIS .11 
However it is unclear how effective this provision is in practice given that is it almost 
impossible to tell if the SIS are abiding by it or not. 
B Issue of Interception Warrants 
The Ministerial interception warrants provided for by the 1977 Amendment Act, under 
section 4A(l) of the principal Act, may be issued provided the Minister is satisfied that 
(a) The interception or seizure is necessary either 
(i) For the detection of activities prejudicial to security; or 
(ii)For the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence .. essential to 
security; and 
(b) The value of the information sought .. is such as to justify the particular 
interception or seizure; and 
(c) The information is not likely to be obtained by any other means; and 
( d) The information is not privileged .. 
It is therefore up to the Minister to balance the competing interests of security and an 
individual's right to privacy and freedom from interference. 
Section 4A(2) provides that any warrant shall specify the type of communication to be 
intercepted as well as the identity of the persons whose communications are sought to be 
intercepted (known as a 'person warrant') or, if their identity is not known, the place 
where the communications may be intercepted or seized (known as a 'place warrant'). 
C Accountability Provisions 
The principal Act expressly confronts the issue of accountability, despite the need for 
secrecy, providing a number of controls on the issue and use of interception warrants. 12 
The application to the Minister for an interception warrant to be issued can only be made 
by the Director of Security, or his/her Deputy, and must be made in writing with the 
accompanying facts or evidence sworn on oath. The commencing of the process is 
therefore claimed to be non-political with an upward, as opposed to downward, moving 
power.13 The Minister is answerable to Parliament and must annually review all warrants 
10 GATT Watchdog "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Amendment Bill I 998. ", 1. 
11 1996 Amendment, above n9, s4(3). 
12 For a discussion of Australian, Canadian and United Kingdom accountability mechanisms see Lawrence 
Lustgarten " Accountability of Security Services in Western Democracies" (1992) 45 Current Legal Prob 
146. 
13 Crowder, above n3, 156. 
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issued and lay a report before Parliament relating to the number of warrants issued in the 
d. 14 prece mg year. 
Also in 1996 two associated pieces of legislation were passed, partly to offset the 
concurrent increase of the SIS's powers through the widening of the definition of 
security, and therefore the ambit of responsibility . The Intelligence and Security 
Committee Act created the five member Committee in charge of overseeing policy issues 
relevant to the SIS. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act (IGISA) was 
enacted to increase the oversight and review of intelligence and security agencies . The 
Inspector-General's functions are to 15 
~ inquire into any matter that relates to intelligence and security agencies compliance 
with the law - section 11 ( l )( a) 
~ inquire into any complaint by a New Zealand person that that person has been 
adversely affected by .. an intelligence and security agency - section 11 ( l )(b) 
~ inquire into any matter where a New Zealand person may have been adversely 
affected, and inquire into the propriety of particular activities - section 11 ( l )( c) 
~ review the effectiveness and appropriateness of the procedures adopted by the SIS to 
ensure compliance with section 4A and section 4B of the principal Act - section 
l l(l)(d) 
~ prepare and submit to the Minister programmes for general oversight and review of 
each intelligence and security agency - section l l(l)(e) and (f). 
The Inspector-General, however, is not allowed to inquire into any action taken by the 
Minister (section 11(2)(3)) nor " . .into any matter that is operationally sensitive, including 
any matter that relates to intelligence collection and production methods or sources of 
information." (section 11(2)(4)) 
The Inspector-General has powers to recommend to the Minister redress for the 
complainant, including remedies that involve payment of compensation - section 11(6). 
However, these powers were of no use to Mr Choudry when the SIS broke into his home 
soon after the 1996 Amendment, as the Inspector-General's report simply stated that the 
SIS actions were not illegal, and that Mr Choudry should not, therefore, receive any form 
of redress. 
Ill CHOUDRY V ATTORNEY-GENERAL 
The second stage of events was the unusual chance presented to the courts to examine the 
1977 Amendment, 19 years after the event, and to undertake its own balancing exercise 
of security interests and accountability. 
14 1977 Amendment. above 116, s4 (inserting s4A(5) into the principal Act) . 
15 As summarised by Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 3-4. 
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A Facts 
The plaintiff, Abdul Aziz Choudry, is a well known political activist and member of a 
group known as GATT Watchdog. A GATT Watchdog Conference on Free Trade was 
being held in opposition to the APEC Trade Ministers meeting which was to take place 
during the week beginning 15 July 1996. 
On 13 July 1996 a colleague of the plaintiff's, Dr Small, disturbed two men rifling 
through papers in the plaintiff's home. In response to this unauthorised entry of his home 
the plaintiff issued proceedings claiming $150 OOO damages for trespass or, alternatively, 
for a breach of his rights to protection from unreasonable search and seizure, under New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA), section 21. 
The Attorney-General pleaded as defence that the entry was lawful since it was done 
pursuant to an interception warrant issued under section 4A(l) of the principal Act. The 
warrant was a person warrant, not a place warrant, but it was unclear whether the plaintiff 
was the sole subject of the warrant or just one of a number of persons identified in it as 
all relevant provisions were deleted from the version of the warrant before the Court. 
There were two main issues to be decided 
(1) whether the interception warrant authorised entry into the plaintiff's home; 
and 
(2) whether public interest immunity could apply to all the documents for which 
it was claimed, in relation to a better discovery application. 
B Interception Warrant Question: the High Court Decision 
Counsel formulated the issue by drawing a distinction between entry onto premises and 
breaking and entering private dwellings. Justice Panckhurst saw no material distinction 
between the two and addressed them as one. However he accepted the distinction 
between person and place warrants. The plaintiff argued that section 4A allows the 
Minister to issue an interception warrant allowing for "the interception or seizure of any 
communication," and neither expressly nor impliedly authorises entry onto premises, let 
alone breaking and entering. Counsel for the SIS argued that by necessary implication an 
interception warrant authorises entry onto private property, and breaking and entering, to 
intercept or seize communications. 
A useful starting point is the common law. Justice Panckhurst quoted several cases, 
including Lord Scarman ' s speech in Morris v Beardmore 16, which makes reference to the 
famous Entick v Carrington 17 case, and concluded that " .. only if Parliament had spoken 
clearly should a power of entry be found to exist." 18 However, the judge continued, this 
is not to say that legislative intention cannot be imputed from the words of the legislation, 
16 [1981] AC 446, 464 (fil). 
17 (1765) 95 ER 807 (KB) . 
18 Choudry v A ttorney-General (1 9 August 1998) w1reported, High Court, Christchurch Registry, CP 15/98, 
11 [Choudry HC] . 
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so long as the implication is " .. necessary in the sense that otherwise the very purpose and 
effect of the section would be frustrated."19 
Justice Panckhurst concluded that an interception warrant issued under section 4A of the 
principal Act authorises covert entry onto premises in order to seize or intercept 
communications, for three reasons; 
(1) the context of the section. The Act is intended to make better provision for 
the SIS so that it can act to protect New Zealand from "activities which may strike at the 
core of the nation's well-being."20 
(2) the concept of interception is defined by an inclusive definition in section 2 of 
the principal Act. How interception and seizure are carried out is left unspecified by 
Parliament. This must have been deliberate and therefore, in the judge's view, carries 
with it the necessary implication that covert entry was contemplated. 
(3) the principal Act allows for both interception and seizure. Although 
interception is possible without entry onto property, the additional power to seize, 
especially in the context of written documents, indicates again that covert entry must 
have been envisaged. 
This conclusion applies to both person and place warrants since " .. ownership or 
occupation of premises by a person identified in the warrant cannot be the limiting 
criteria."21 In the learned Judge's opinion limiting factors are given in section 4A(6) of 
the principal Act which grants immunity for" .. reasonable action necessarily involved in 
making .. the interception or seizure .. " (emphasis added) . 
C Public Interest Immunity: the High Court Decision 
Verified lists of documents were exchanged between the parties and in relation to about 
70 of the documents objection was raised to their production on the grounds of public 
interest. Justice Panckhurst considered that it would not be appropriate to uphold the 
Prime Minister's certificate advising against disclosure without inspection of the 
documents. He came to this conclusion because of two main considerations. The first 
was the relevance of most, if not all, of the documents . The sole defence to the trespass 
and unreasonableness claims was lawful authority, so documents relating to the ambit 
and implementation of the warrant will be highly relevant in deciding these issues. 
Secondly, no detailed reasons were given to support the Prime Minister' s claim that 
producing the documents would be prejudicial to security.22 Also, the Act provides that 
the right of lawful dissent should not be limited and the plaintiffs descriptions of the 
nature of his activities at the time as solely political remain unchallenged. 
D Interception Warrant Question: the Court of Appeal Decision 
The Court of Appeal unanimously reversed Justice Panckhurst's finding that the 
interception warrant authorised entry into the plaintiff's home. They found that the focus 
19 Choudry HC, above nl8, 12 
20 Choudry HC, above nl8, 19. 
21 Choudry HC, above nl8, 21. 
22 Compare with Haj-Ismail v Maddigan (1982) 45 ALR 379 (FCA). 
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of section 4A is the interception of communications which " .. refers to the action of 
gaining access to information which is being passed from . . source to intended 
destination. "23 The section allows for interception of what is being passed and, although 
the method of such interception or seizure is left open, " .. in the absence of clear 
authorisation it does not allow for the commission of further crimes or torts."24 
There is nothing in the statutory scheme or language to suggest that interception warrants 
were intended to grant the SIS powers to enter onto private property without the owner's 
consent. Also relevant is that statutory provisions affecting bodies equivalent to the SIS 
in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom all make express provision for warrants to 
authorise entry onto private property. 25 These statutes recognise that at common law any 
invasion onto private property is a trespass and it is a fundamental constitutional 
consideration that any erosion of common law protections should be set out in the 
clearest of terms. Therefore the power of entry, or of breaking and entering, onto private 
premises is not conferred by section 4A(l) . 
E Public Interest Immunity: the Court of Appeal Decision 
The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court decision that the Court should review the 
documents in question before deciding whether to uphold the Prime Minister's certificate. 
They recognised that while New Zealand courts pay deference to a certificate by a 
Minister that production of certain documents will be contrary to the public interest, they 
are not bound by it. 26 Most judicial statements about deferring to executive decisions 
have been made in the context of a narrow definition of the concept of national security, 
as opposed to the wide definition given in the principal Act. Also there has been a move 
in recent times to a more open government in New Zealand. 
The Prime Minister's certificate claims immunity for a wide range of documents with 
only very vague reasons why the security of New Zealand would be affected. It is 
therefore unclear which aspect of security is involved, and so impossible to determine 
where the balance lies between public interest in keeping the documents confidential and 
public interest in effective administration of justice. Balancing these interests is a judicial 
function, not a Ministerial one, and the Court needs to be fully informed in order to carry 
out that exercise. The Court will only require inspection of the documents if the Prime 
23 Chou dry v A ttorney-General (9 December 1998) unreported, Court of Appeal , CA217 /98, 15 l Chou dry 
CA] . 
24 Choudry CA, above n23, 15. 
25 See Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979, s25 ; Canadian Security Intelligence Act 
1984, s2 l ; United Kingdom Interception of Communications Act 1985, s3 ; Security Services Act 1989, s3 
[deals with MIS - the internal security body]; Intelligence Services Act 1994, s5 [deals with MI6 and 
GCHQ - the international security bodies] . For a discussion on these Acts and the Services they govern see 
Australia - H.P Lee, "The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation - New Mechanisms for 
Accountability" (1989) 38 ICLQ 890. Canada - L.Ll.J Edwards 'The Canadian Security Intelligence Act 
1984 - a Canadian Appraisal" (1985) 5 Oxford J Leg Studies 143 . United Kingom - Ian J Lloyd "The 
Interception of Communications Act 1985" (1986) 49 MLR 86; Ian Leigh and Laurence Lustgarten. "The 
Security Services Act 1989" ( 1989) 52 MLR 801 ; Philip Leach, "The Security Service Bill" ( 1996) 146 
New L J 224; John Wadham, 'The Intelligence Services Act 1994" (1994) 57 MLR 916. 
26 Corbett v Social Security Commission [1962] NZLR 878 (CA). 
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Minister does not file an amended certificate or if the amended certificate still leaves the 
Court in doubt as to the security interests to be balanced. 
On 6 July 1999 the Court of Appeal considered the Prime Minister's amended certificate 
and held by a four to one majority that it should be upheld, and the relevant documents 
not produced. Although the certificate was not as particularised as the Court had 
suggested (that is it did not provide details on which aspect of security was involved on a 
document by document basis) it was much more detailed than the first. The Court then 
seemed to backtrack from their last decision on the matter by saying that the judiciary 
does not have the skills or knowledge to say that the Prime Minister's view is not correct. 
In his dissenting judgment, Justice Thomas stressed that the issue was whether the 
documents should be shown to the Court, not whether they should be made public. Also 
important was the fact that, in his opinion, the only way the SIS can be held accountable 
is through the courts, since it cannot be held truly accountable through Parliament due to 
national security concerns. In addition he restated the court's previous position that 
balancing public interests is a judicial function, and he seemed unable to reconcile the 
majority's position that the court could not do so competently, with placing trust in the 
Prime Minister to be able to do so.27 
Mr Choudry is still planning on taking the SIS back to the High Court in relation to his 
damages claim for the break in. 28 
F Was the Court of Appeal Correct? 
The issue of concern here is whether interception warrants issued under the principal Act 
authorised entry onto private property. It is clear that the Court of Appeal's approach is 
more black letter than the court below and, in this context, also more constitutionally 
correct. It was common ground between both courts that the power of entry onto private 
property should only be found if Parliament had clearly provided for it. The divergence 
arose as to the question of whether Parliament had so clearly provided. Although the 
High Court's reasons are well presented and quite compelling, the Court of Appeal's 
position of refusing to import a meaning not immediately clear into the words of a statute 
that infringes upon individual rights must be more correct. The fundamental principle of 
express authorisation for an invasion of rights, such as covert entry, must have been 
known by Parliament and so the absence of any express provision is a clear indication of 
Parliament's intent. Also, although the High Court ' s interpretation can logically be 
implied from the words in the section, it is going too far to say that it is a necessary 
implication in the sense that the section would have no effect if it was not interpreted in 
that manner. 
Even if, contrary to the above argument, it was Parliament's intention to confer such a 
power, it is not the court's role to fix or patch up deficient legislation. It is for Parliament 
to clarify the position when it is insufficiently stated especially where, as in the present 
case, individual liberties are being infringed - which is exactly what Parliament did . 
27 Choudry v Attorney-General (6 July 1999) unreported., Court of Appeal , CA 217/99. 
28 Court of Appeal Rules in Favour of SIS" Salient, Wellington, New Zealand, 12 July 1999, 9. 
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IV NEW ZEALAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AMENDMENT 
BILL 1998 
A Original Bill 
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998 (the Bill) was 
introduced into Parliament on 16 December 1998 in response to the Court of Appeal's 
decision in Choudry v Attorney-General holding that there was no power of entry into 
private premises pursuant to an interception warrant. The purpose of the Bill is to confer 
express powers to enter property to install or remove devices/equipment or to remove 
material. 29 There is some debate, not to be covered in depth here, as to whether the Bill 
confers new powers on the SIS or whether it just confirms powers they have in reality 
had since the 1977 amendment. 
Clause 3 of the Bill is the most important because it contains the provisions relating to 
interception warrants. It 'clarifies' that int~rception and seizure relate not only to 
communications but also to documents or "things". Clause 3(4) repeals section 4A(2)(b) 
of the principal Act and replaces it with a distinction between warrants for interception of 
communications and those for seizure of documents or things. So new paragraph (b) 
provides that a warrant should state the name of the person whose communications are to 
be intercepted, or the place where those communications are if the person's identity is not 
known. Paragraph (ba) then provides that if documents or things are to be seized the 
warrant should state the place where the documents or things are likely to be. 
Clause 3(5) enacts subsections 3A to 3E, to be inserted after section 4A(3). Subsections 
38 and 3C give express powers to enter any place specified in the warrant or any place 
where the person whose communications are to be intercepted is or is likely to be 
(subsection 38) or, for a warrant to seize documents or things, any place specified in the 
warrant (subsection 3C). 
The distinction between interception warrants for intercepting communications and those 
for seizing documents or things is important for in subsections 3D and 3E (also enacted 
by Clause 3(5)) different powers are conferred depending on whether the officer is acting 
pursuant to powers under subsection 38 or 3C. 
B Changes Made by the Committee 
The Committee made three changes designed to minimise the impact of interception 
warrants on third parties. Firstly, they qualified "any place" in subsection 38 so that 
under a warrant to intercept communications an officer can enter 
(a) any place specified in the warrant; or 
(b) any place owned/occupied by the person whose communications are to be 
intercepted; or 
(c) any place that person is likely to be, only with prior approval of the 
Director 
Also, the Director must advise the Minister without delay of any approval given under 
29 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998, no 259-1 , i (the commentary) [1998 
Bill] . 
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section 4A(3B)(c) and provides that everyone acting pursuant to an interception warrant 
must take all reasonable steps " .. to minimise the likelihood of intercepting or seizing 
communications that are not relevant to [the person named in the warrant]"30 
The word "thing" was removed and replaced it with "device or equipment" throughout 
clauses 3 and 4, that is in relation to the issue of interception warrants and the removal of 
things after the warrant ceases to be in force . However it is retained in new section 
4A(3E) (powers while acting under a warrant to seize documents or things) when 
referring to being able to access any document or thing. 
Lastly, clause 4 was amended, section 4AB(2)(ab) of the principal Act, to provide that all 
warrants shall specify a time period of validity not exceeding 12 months, with a right to 
reapply after expiry. 
C Submissions Relating to the Above Cnanges 
1. No time limit 
Providing, as the principal Act currently does, that interception warrants shall be " .. valid 
for the time specified therein"31 is quite a departure from police warrants issued under 
section 198 of the Summary Proceedings Act, which allows search warrants to exist for 
only 1 month. The power to enter houses can be open to abuse without checks and 
balances, one of which is to provide a finite term for warrants.32 Another problem with 
having warrants valid for as long as each individual one states is that the information that 
was relied upon in order to issue that warrant may be 'stale ' and out of date by the time it 
is acted upon. Rights of privacy should not be invaded on the basis of information that 
may no longer be correct. For example, in the Choudry case the warrant was 10 months 
old - issued 5 September 1995 and acted upon on 13 July 1996. It is argued that both the 
warrant and the information on which it was based were, by that stage, out of date.33 
If this argument is accepted that 10 months is too long for a warrant to be in force, then 
the Committee's provision calling for all warrants to be in force for less than 12 months 
is a cosmetic change not really addressing the heart of the issue. Interestingly the Powles 
Report, which was the impetus for the 1977 Amendment Act, recommended that any 
warrant to intercept should have a maximum period of validity of ninety days.34 
2. "Any place" under a person warrant 
Allowing the SIS to enter any place where the person whose communications are to be 
intercepted is or is likely to be is a very extensive provision. All that would be required 
to search any individual's home would be a belief that the person named in the warrant 
may be at that place at any time. This would allow the SIS to break into the homes of 
30 1998 Bill. above n29, cl 4A (inserting s4BA in the principal Act). 
31 The principal Act, above n4, s4A(2)(d). 
32 Dunedin Community Law Centre "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998." , 2. 
33 Auckland Council for Civil Liberties "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 4. 
34 Report by Chief Ombudsman Security Intelligence Service (Wellington, 1976), 60. 
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completely innocent third parties who are not the subject of a warrant, which is an 
unacceptable extension of the warrant's scope. 35 Theoretically the amended requirement 
of obtaining the prior approval of the Director before exercising the statutory power 
should provide against unreasonable extensions of a warrant, but this safeguard is 
weakened by the fact that the Director is not completely removed from the situation, 
calling into question his/her impartiality when deciding what is reasonable and necessary. 
3. "Thing " 
The term ''thing" is so general and unregulated that it could apply to anything 
whatsoever. Parliament needed to provide a " .. more explicit definition of the types of 
devices and articles which [it] has in mind."36 Allowing the SIS to install or remove any 
"thing" could point towards a very ominous conclusion as to just what exactly the SIS 
want to install or remove. 37 
V NEW ZEALAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE AMENDMENT 
BILL (No 2) 1999 
A The Second Bill 
The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill (No 2) 1999 (the second 
Bill) was introduced to deal with other concerns raised by submissions to the first Bill. 
The second Bill is designed to provide greater certainty as to when SIS powers may be 
exercised and to provide safeguards against potential abuse.38 
The second Bill divides interception warrants into two categories; 
(1) foreign interception warrants: interception warrants not aimed at a New 
Zealand citizen or resident. They will continue to be issued by the Minister in charge of 
the SIS; and 
(2) domestic interception warrants: all other interception warrants . They will be 
issued if both the Minister in charge of the SIS and the Commissioner of Security 
Warrants (the Commissioner) are satisfied that the conditions in the Act are met. 
The Commissioner's position is enacted by clause 6 of the second Bill, inserting section 
SA after section 5 in the principal Act. The Commissioner must have held office as a 
High Court judge (section 5A(3)) and is appointed for a term of three years, though s/he 
may be reappointed (section SB(l)). This provides another example of Parliament 
attempts to maintain a balance between security and accountability. Another perceived 
increase in SIS powers calls for a further increase in accountability provisions - just as 
when the Inspector-General ' s role was created. 
35 Auckland Council for Civil Liberties, above n3 3, 5. 
36 Association of University of New Zealand (Inc.) "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee 
on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 3. 
37 GAIT Watchdog, above nlO, 2. 
38 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill (No. 2) 1999, no 264-1 , explanatory note. 
[ 1999 Bi Ill 
11 
Balancing Security and Accountability: SIS Legislation and Recent Amendments 
There is a change to the definition of security - clause 2(2). The first component (a) 
"protection of New Zealand from acts of espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and subversion" 
remains unchanged from the principal Act. Paragraph (b) is new, and is narrower than 
the existing definition from the 1996 amendment. It provides for "the identification of 
foreign, or foreign-influenced, capabilities, intentions, or activities within or relating to 
New Zealand that impact on New Zealand's international well-being or economic well-
being." 
Clause 3 introduces section 4AA to 'ensure' the political neutrality of the SIS . It requires 
the Director to ensure that SIS activities are limited to its functions, the SIS is kept free 
from irrelevant considerations and that the SIS does not further the interests of any 
political party. Also the Minister is prohibited from directing the SIS to put anyone under 
surveillance. 
B Submissions Addressed in the Second Bill 
I. Security definition 
The security definition, as amended in 1996, was very wide and open to subjective 
interpretation. By using the phrase 'contribution' to New Zealand's economic or 
international well-being, it seemed to be authorising surveillance of anyone speaking out 
against current policies of the government of the day. The 1996 amendment seemed to 
serve no real, useful purpose. If Parliament had in mind any " .. specific activities not 
already covered by sabotage, espionage, terrorism or subversion, but which greatly 
threaten New Zealand's interests they should be precisely identified, not covered with a 
blanket phrase open to widely different political interpretations."39 
Even with the amended definition it is questionable whether anything is added. Surely 
"sabotage, espionage, terrorism or subversion", as set out in part (a) of the definition, is a 
wide enough mandate to cover all those activities the SIS should be concerned with. They 
would seem to keep the SIS focussed on its prime objective - to ensure the continued 
existence of a democratic state in New Zealand. Why then does part (b) of the definition 
include the "identification of foreign .. activities .. that impact on New Zealand's 
international .. or economic well-being." Does this mean that it is now permissible for 
New Zealanders to speak out against current government policies, but not someone who 
is not a New Zealand resident or citizen without coming under SIS scrutiny? Surely if a 
foreign person, organisation or power is seriously threatening the existence of our 
democratic state then they would be identified in the process of gathering information to 
protect New Zealand under part (a). Part (b) therefore appears redundant with respect to 
the primary focus of the SIS and raises questions as to the validity of and reasons for 
identifying, and collecting information on, foreign activities if they will not result in any 
kind of attempted threat to New Zealand society. 
2. Joint issuing of warrants 
The argument for Ministerial warrants runs along these lines; the issue of warrants for 
39 The Pacific Institute of Resource Management "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee 
on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 2. 
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security reasons is essentially an executive act which the courts should not interfere with. 
The ongoing dialogue the Minister has with the SIS means that s/he is well placed to 
assess the value of the information sought as well as the context of the application. Also 
the issues that need to be weighed in a security case are different to those in a criminal 
situation. Interception warrants are not comparable to police warrants because they are 
not used for any criminal prosecution purpose but are simply a means for gathering 
intelligence. Using judges may also compromise security. The fewer people who know 
about the detail of warrants issued the more secure an operation is. Since there are a lot 
of judges sitting at different times, even within a particular court, there is the possibility 
of many people knowing about an operation should different judges be available when 
several warrants are sought on the same case. Also differing subjective opinions of 
judges may lead to inconsistencies as to when warrants will be issued. 
On the other hand, it is often argued that an interception warrant should be a judicial one 
because it appears to offer better external accountability and reassurance that an 
individual's rights will be protected. Also, although Judges naturally have their biases, 
their independence from the political process puts them in a much better position to make 
an objective judgment based on the merits of a particular application rather than being 
improperly motivated. 
The third prevalent view is that the process should be a mixed one. The Minister should 
naturally be involved in the process since s/he has important experience in political and 
security matters. However, bringing in a judicial aspect as well implicitly recognises that 
sometimes someone experienced in the law will see compelling objections to justify the 
rejection of a request for a warrant. 40 
The creation of the office of Commissioner addresses all of the points raised above. The 
Minister is still involved in this so called executive act but there is also a judicial element, 
hopefully affording more protection for the public. The security argument is addressed 
by not providing for any judge' s approval in order to issue a warrant but for the 
Commissioner's approval, who brings to the position a background in the High Court. 
VJ OTHER ISSUES ARISING FROM THE BILL 
A No Need/or a Secret Service 
Many submissions were made to the Committee that the SIS is superfluous now that the 
cold war has ended. Many felt that the SIS has similar objectives to the police and that 
its functions could be carried out efficiently, and perhaps more effectively, by the police. 
As was pointed out in one particular submission, " .. covert activities do not necessarily 
require a covert organisation."41 However it is also important to recognise that in the 
40 Dennis Rose "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998. ", 5. 
41 Don Carson "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998. ", l. 
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current climate of globalisation and increased levels of technology, New Zealand is no 
longer the isolated little country that we used to be. International terrorists are very well 
organised and have agents all over the world. No one would wish to see New Zealand 
become a safe haven for these terrorists, so it probably can be assumed that the existence 
of the SIS can be justified. Also we have entered into alliances with other countries 
allowing us to obtain information from their intelligence agencies, and we therefore have 
a reciprocal obligation to share credible and useful information. 
B No Accountability 
The Intelligence and Security Committee that oversees the actions of the SIS, and heard 
submissions for the proposed Bill, is a Prime Ministerial Committee as opposed to a 
select committee. It is questionable whether this is adequate, especially its two party 
composition, in light of the proportional representation system. The Committee is made 
up of very busy people which, when combined with the inability to question secret 
advice, means the Committee is incapable of providing effective oversight. A select 
committee on the other hand is theoretically made up of MPs who specialise in a 
particular area and are more prepared to probe into issues which the agency may prefer to 
keep to itself 42 It is, of course, questionable whether this would hold true in practice. 
The role of the Inspector-General is one of the statutory checks currently in place. 
Whether the Inspector-General provided any check on the SIS in the Choudry situation is 
doubtful given that he was refusing to confirm or deny that the SIS were even involved in 
the break-in. It is also worth noting that the powers the Inspector General has are 
investigatory only, so he has no power to give redress for any grievances other than 
making recommendations to the Prime Minister. Also the Director of the SIS and the 
Prime Minister may censor the report of the Inspector-General. 43 
The Minister's reports to Parliament, as required by section 4A(5), are no real safeguard. 
As noted by the Privacy Commissioner "[t]he reports invariably run to three paragraphs. 
The wording has remained almost identical in the 21 years of reporting .. A formulaic 
approach has been followed which appears designed to offer ritual reassurance but 
convey minimal information."44 
To allow for proper accountability of the SIS a complainant should be allowed to know 
the defence the SIS is claiming in relation to their complaint, and they should be given 
the opportunity to refute this defence by way of legal submissions and cross-. · 45 exam1nat1on. 
42 Nicky Hager "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Conunittee on the New Zealand Security 
Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998. ", 2. 
43 New Zealand Trade Union Federation "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the 
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 4. 44 Privacy Commissioner "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 4. 
45 Democratic Rights Defence Fund "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New 
Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 4. 
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There should be provision for people subject to a search under an interception warrant to 
contest the invasion in open court. However this true accountability is not possible 
because it is provided in section 4A(6)(b) that the issue of warrants not be subject to 
judicial review. An argument may be made that purely domestic security cases can be 
distinguished from those with international connections, like the second Bill purports to 
do, and that the former should be subject to judicial review but not the latter.46 
Even without section 4A(6)(b) it is difficult to see how it could be argued that the courts 
could review the reasons behind a decision to issue an interception warrant due to the 
subjective wording of the Act itself, which precludes a court returning to the decision and 
objectively determining whether it was correct. The classic formulation of the distinction 
between subjective and objective belief is found in Lord Atkin' s dissenting judgment in 
Liversidge v Anderson.47 The central issue before the House of Lords in that case was 
whether the "reasonable cause" condition in. the statute in question was subjective or 
objective, that is whether it was sufficient that the Secretary of State thought he had 
reasonable cause or whether the court could determine, objectively, whether he in fact 
had reasonable cause. Lord Atkin held that reasonable cause is an objective test. 48 This 
has been accepted in New Zealand, where it has also been held that "good cause" is not 
materially different to "reasonable cause."49 
However, the SIS legislation, both before and after amendment, makes no reference to 
either "reasonable cause" or "good cause" to believe in relation to the issue of 
interception warrants. Indeed section 4A(l) says that an interception warrant may be 
issued " .. if the Minister and the Commissioner are both satisfied .. that the conditions 
specified .. apply." Similarly worded sections, requiring only satisfaction, were referred 
to by Lord Atkin as being " .. plain that unlimited discretion is given .. " provided that the 
Minister acts in good faith .50 This must necessarily be the case. Were they to be given 
the same meaning there would be no point in using the different phrases "reasonable" and 
"satisfied." Therefore, even disregarding the express exclusion of the courts jurisdiction, 
the only way the Minister' s decision could be questioned would be to bring into doubt the 
Minister' s honest belief that the criteria were satisfied. 
The inclusion of section 4A(l)(b) removing any right to judicial review, as well as the 
very wording of the statute, substantially impairs true accountability. The argument may 
be raised, analogous to the argument in Choudry in relation to the discovery application, 
that showing reasonable grounds for the Minister ' s decision would impair security by 
requiring the production of sensitive material. The answer to that is simply that should 
the Crown refuse to produce evidence proving reasonableness where it is brought into 
question, the court would not force the production of the alleged sensitive material but 
would simply enter a finding for the plaintiff on the grounds of no defence raised. 
46 Crowder, above n3 , 159. 
47 [1942] AC 206 (HL). [Liversidge] 
48 Liversidge, above 1147, 227-228 per Lord Atkin dissenting. 49 
See Police v Anderson [1977] NZLR 233 (CA); Meates v Attorney-Genera! (Customs Department) 
[ 1981] 2 NZLR 335 (HC); Dulcie Holdings Ltd v New Zealand Customs Service [ 1997] DCR I 077 (DC). 50 liversidge, above n 47, 233 per Lord Atkin dissenting. 
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C Search and Seizure Already has Widespread Legislative Provision 
The Summary Proceedings Act, the Misuse of Drugs Act and many others provide for powers of search and seizure. These powers typically require prior approval from an independent authority, except in specific situations. The person whose property is to be entered is entitled to know that it is and pursuant to which authority. Also such entry is generally open to legal review. Given the wide range of circumstances that already exist to justify entry it is questionable whether these circumstances need to be extended, and in such a fashion as to remove all the safeguards and specificity the courts and legislature have introduced over the years.51 
D Did the 1977 Parliament Intend the SIS to have the power? 
It has been argued by many, including Prime Minister (PM) Rt Hon Jenny Shipley and Opposition Leader Rt Hon Helen Clark, that t·he Bill in fact gives no new powers to the SIS - that it actually just confirms the powers that it has always been presumed to have. 52 
This is evidenced, so the argument goes, by the comments of both the PM at the time, Rt Hon Robert Muldoon, and the then Leader of the Opposition, Rt Hon Bill Rowling. The then PM said, in debate, that " .. the possession of an interception warrant might authorise breaking and entering, but it would not absolve the person named in the warrant from 
committing, for example, a theft."53 In opposition to the Bill Rt Hon Bill Rowling said " .. the interception warrant gives power not only to open mail and tap phones, but also to break into private premises .. "54 
However there was no such express recommendation given in the Powles Report, and surely any anticipated intrusion on individuals' rights would have warranted a full 
discussion in his report. Also there are other statements made by members of the House during the 1977 debates which seem to conflict with the PM's and Opposition Leader' s 
comments. For example, Government MP Barry Brill said "The Bill does not extend the powers of the Prime Minister and the SIS; it restricts the powers."55 So it would seem 
that individual comments made by members, especially if not picked up on and contested by other members, are nowhere near conclusive. In the end it all boils down to the fundamental constitutional principle that if Parliament is going to infringe upon fundamental rights of citizens then it needs to do so express! y and clear! y. In the 1977 
amendment no such express provision for entering onto private property was made and so it cannot be presumed that Parliament intended to do so. 
E Breach of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
Article 17: (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. 
51 Rose, above n40, 2. 
52 (15 December 1998) 574 NZPD 14663. 
53 (8 September 1977) 41 3 NZPD 2783. 
54 (18 October I 977) 414 NZPD 3 722. 
55 (4 November 1977) 415 NZPD 4224. 
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Article 19: (1) Everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference. 
(2) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression .. 
The Bill increases the level of 'interference' that may be exercised by the SIS . 
'Interference' clearly covers intrusion onto property, into communications and the seizing 
of any communications or documents. These interferences can be classified as arbitrary 
in that the body carrying out the interferences has no realistic accountability to the public, 
there is no room for judicial supervision or review in the principal Act, nor is there any 
sufficient compensation available to complainants. Under the existing Act the argument 
is even stronger, for the SIS can institute surveillance under the undefined phrase of 
contributing to New Zealand's economic and international well being. Due to the 
subjective and imprecise nature of these terms any search on these grounds would 
necessarily be unpredictable, depending largely on who was defining the terms at the 
time, and therefore arbitrary.56 
The Choudry case would seem to legitimately raise concerns that the SIS are being used 
to target political activists who are no real threat to New Zealand security at all. That Mr 
Choudry's assertions as to the type of activity he was involved in at the time of the 
search, that is purely political, have never been challenged serves to fuel the speculations. 
If this is what the service is being used for then this clearly contravenes Article 19, not to 
mention the principal Act itself 
F Not Many Warrants 
It is argued by some that there is a lot of needless fuss about interception warrants 
because there are not very many issued during a year, usually about 4 or 5.57 However 
the number of warrants issued really misses the point because they can be in force for a 
long time and can cover many people, places and organisations. 
G Lack of Competency Examples 
There are reports of surveillance of Trade Unions, peace movements, the anti-Vietnam 
war movement, the anti-apartheid movement and refugees who, in the opinions of the 
intelligence agencies of the regimes they are fleeing, are viewed as dangerous.58 It has 
also been rumoured that the SIS at one stage monitored anyone opposed to the sale of 
SOE' s, clearly an example of political use of the SIS if true.59 In 1986 Ms Wendy 
Walters, a Public Service Association delegate and parliamentary secretary, went public 
after the SIS approached her to undertake some political spying. 60 There are many other 
reports of dubious SIS activities, though more often than not they are unconfirmed which 
is hardly surprising given the lack of information forthcoming from anyone connected to 
the SIS. The credibility of the SIS is further undermined when these reports are coupled 
56 New Zealand Trade Union Federation. above 1143,7. 
57 Privacy Commissioner, above n44, appendix. 
58 The Alliance Party, "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 1. 
59 Peace Council of Aotearoa New Zealand Incorporated, "Submission to the Intelligence and Security 
Committee on the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", 3. 
60 Spy-Catching Rebounds in Caucus" The Dominion, Wellington, New Zealand, 10 Nov 1986, 2. 
17 
• 
Balancing Security and Accow1tability: SIS Legislation and Recent Amendments 
with the perceived failures of the SIS, such as the Rainbow Warrior bombing where the 
popular understanding is that the police brought the French people involved to justice not 
the SIS, the loss of apple cuttings to Chilean orchardists, not to mention that the Choudry 
case seems to illustrate that " .. the SIS can't even pull off a routine covert break-in 
without being caught and traced.',6 1 
H Is it Possible for the SIS to Act Properly Without the Power? 
It is argued that without a power of covert entry onto premises the SIS would not be able 
to effectively carry out its functions. However, there are strong arguments to suggest that 
this power is not necessary at all. As GATT Watchdog commented " .. technology [has] 
advanced far enough to mean that listening devices do not need to be placed inside 
telephones or under picture frames as in Bond movies .. " 62 There has been a dramatic 
increase in the types of communications as well as the ways in which interception can be 
implemented. All of these fall within the ambit of the 1977 provision, making it an 
untenable position to claim that the SIS cannot perform its functions without a power to 
enter private property. 
I Bill of Rights Act 1990, Section 21 
It is arguable that the interception warrant scheme allowing for entry onto personal 
property is contrary to section 21 of the BORA, protecting against unreasonable search 
and seizure. Arguably the scheme is unreasonable due to the factors discussed above in 
relation to arbitrariness, that is citizens are not informed that they are having their houses 
searched and why, they have no realistic recourse to the Courts to review the powers 
exercised, the current definition of security means the grounds on which warrants can be 
issued are vague and open to subjective interpretation leading to unpredictable 
application and what control mechanisms there are are widely perceived as inadequate. 
However, the flipside to this argument is that any inconsistency with the BORA does not 
have to be remedied by reading in requirements more consistent with the BORA, as the 
Courts have been willing to do in the past. 63 This is because section 5 of the BORA 
allows for infringements of the BORA rights provided that they are " .. demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society." Arguably the powers in the Bill are 
demonstrably justified in that they are designed to protect New Zealand from terrorism 
and espionage ensuring that we remain a democratic society. For those that view the SIS 
as acting on behalf of the Government with a political agenda and targeting those with 
opinions that differ from the majority, then clearly the powers are not demonstrably 
justified and in fact run contrary to democracy, which has at its heart the voicing of 
political dissent. 
61 Anti-Bases Campaign "Submission to the Intelligence and Security Committee on the New Zealand 
Security Intelligence Service Amendment Bill 1998.", I. 
62 GATI Watchdog, above n!O, 2. 
63 See for example R v Laugalis ( 1993) I HRNZ 466 (CA). 
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VII CONCLUSION 
Attempting to balance notions of security with public accountability is something New 
Zealand has always struggled to deal with, and always will due to its irreconcilable 
nature. 
However, in 1969 New Zealand probably chose the most democratic way of dealing with 
this conflict when Parliament drew the SIS out from the shadows of Crown prerogative 
and created a statutory body. 
The wheels of change in a democracy have never been anything but lumbersome, and 
recent events relating to the SIS have borne that out. However, despite the 30 year wait 
since the SIS became a statutory body, these events have also provided an adroit 
illustration of how the democratic process of checks and balances is supposed to work. 
In 1996, when Parliament wanted to change -the definition of security, it had to do so 
publicly and concurrently increase the accountability provisions. Soon after the Choudry 
case provided the courts with an unusual chance to peruse the 1977 Amendment, and to 
ultimately hold that the legislation did not allow for covert entry into private premises. 
Fallowing on from this, in 1998/1999, Parliament has had to clarify and specify what the 
powers of the SIS are. Again it had to do so publicly, and respond to public demands for 
more accountability through the increased specificity of all areas relating to the SIS, and 
the creation of the Commissioner' s role. 
As the century draws to a close so does this latest chapter of New Zealand ' s attempts to 
fit the SIS within a democratic, open government framework. It is clear that the struggle 
between accountability and security will continue well into the future. What is not so 
clear is the full impact of the recent changes to the principal Act and, if history 1s 
anything to go by, that information will not be available for several years yet. 
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